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Abstract	
Do	international	organizations	affect	the	views	of	the	people	who	work	for	them?	
Although	increasingly	sophisticated	methods	have	been	used	to	address	this	question,	
disagreement	persists	about	whether	the	beliefs	of	staff	are	formed	before	or	after	they	
enter	the	institution,	or	shaped	by	instrumental	calculation.	Drawing	on	an	original	
dataset	based	on	the	first	fully	representative	survey	of	the	European	Commission’s	
workforce,	this	article	breaks	new	ground	by	putting	different	definitions	of	
‘supranationalism’	to	the	test	and	by	capturing	multiple	ways	in	which	individuals	may	
be	affected	by	the	experience	of	working	for	the	organization.	For	the	first	time,	it	
demonstrates	that	commitment	to	‘supranationalism’	varies	between	Commission	staff	
groupings,	that	the	influences	on	belief	vary	with	the	measure	of	‘supranationalism’	
used,	and	that	both	post-recruitment	experience	and	pre-recruitment	roles	play	a	part	
in	shaping	beliefs.	
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What	bureaucrats	believe	and	what	shapes	their	beliefs	have	been	long-standing	
preoccupations	in	the	practice	and	the	study	of	public	administration.	In	this	context,	
international	civil	servants	have	commanded	particular	attention.	In	a	literature	
spanning	several	disciplinary	fields	(see	Pollack	1998;	Checkel	2005;	Scully	2005),	
interest	has	focused	on	the	extent	to	which	staff	express	the	organizational	values	
embodied	by	their	institutions.	
In	the	case	of	the	European	Union	(EU),	the	socializing	power	of	the	European	
Commission	over	its	staff	went	unquestioned	for	four	decades.	It	was	confidently	
asserted	not	only	that	the	Commission	would	be	populated	by	pro-Europeans,	eager	to	
expand	EU	competencies	and	therefore	their	own	power,	but	that	their	zealous	pro-
Europeanism	would	be	contagious.	Indeed,	successive	versions	of	neofunctionalism,	a	
classic	theory	of	European	integration,	identified	the	communication	by	Commission	
officials	of	supranational	values	to	national	political	and	economic	elites	as	a	key	
dynamic	of	that	process	(Haas	1958:	17,	Lindberg	1963:	84).	
These	assumptions	were	first	challenged	in	the	late	1990s,	confirmed	in	later	
work	(Hooghe	2002,	2005,	Dehousse	and	Thompson	2012,	Kassim	et	al	2013:	ch	4),	
when	empirical	investigation	revealed	variations	in	the	views	held	by	Commission	staff	
(Hooghe	1999a,	1999b).	Three	explanations	accounting	for	the	views	held	by	
Commission	officials	emerged	in	the	new	wave	of	literature	that	followed	Hooghe’s	
landmark	research.	According	to	the	first	school,	which	quickly	became	the	dominant	
wisdom,	the	pre-recruitment	experience	of	staff	is	decisive	(Hooghe	1999a,	1999b,	
2002,	2005;	Bes	2013).	The	values	of	the	individuals	who	form	its	workforce	are	formed	
within	national	environments	before	they	ever	enter	the	Commission.	A	second	
perspective	contests	the	first	and	argues,	to	the	contrary,	that	post-recruitment	
experience	--	specifically,	the	working	environment	in	the	Commission	--	does	have	an	
impact	on	the	loyalties	of	staff	(Trondal	2006,	2007).	For	the	third,	inspired	by	public	
choice	accounts,	employee	preferences	are	shaped	by	self-interest	(Bauer	2012,	Kassim	
et	al	2013:	ch	4).		In	addition,	several	hybrid	approaches	combine	elements	of	these	
three	perspectives.	Murdoch	and	Geys	(2012),	for	example,	links	behavioural	role	
criteria	from	the	second	to	the	instrumental	cost–benefit	calculation	of	the	third.	
Despite	the	important	insights	it	offers,	however,	the	new	wave	of	scholarship	
exhibits	three	major	shortcomings.	The	first	concerns	the	dependent	variable.	Authors	
take	commitment	to	‘supranationalism’	as	the	assumed	outcome	of	socialization	in	the	
Commission	and	an	indicator	of	the	Commission’s	socializing	power.	Although	the	term	
is	central	to	their	inquiry,	scholars	rarely	reflect	on	its	precise	meaning	or	quality.	Yet	
whether	‘supranationalism’	is	a	preference	for	a	particular	form	of	governance,	a	
motivation,	or	a	conception	of	the	Commission’s	role,	is	a	fundamental	question.	In	
addition,	the	measures	of	‘supranationalism’	scholars	use	are	often	oblique.	As	a	result,	
the	operationalization	of	the	term	frequently	arrives	at	a	construct	that	lies	at	some	
distance	from	the	values	actually	registered	by	respondents.	
The	second	shortcoming	relates	to	the	narrow	sample	on	which	existing	studies	
are	founded.	The	literature	typically	reports	findings	based	on	data	relating	to	a	small	
number	of	individuals	or	to	a	particular	subgroup	within	a	staff	category.	Even	setting	
aside	other	relevant	characteristics,	such	as	level	of	seniority,	nationality,	gender	or	
location,	which	are	important	to	ensuring	that	a	sample	is	representative	of	the	
organization’s	population,	such	an	approach	neglects	the	differentiated	composition	of	
the	Commission	workforce.	Staff	belong	to	different	formal	categories	--	they	are	
administrators,	assistants,	temporary	agents,	contract	agents	and	seconded	national	
experts	–	and	occupy	a	position	(‘grade’)	in	a	hierarchy	within	those	groupings.	
‘Administrators’,	for	example,	encompasses	senior	and	middle	managers	in	high	grades,	
and	policy	officers	in	non-management	roles	in	lower	grades.	Other	groupings,	for	
example,	temporary	agents,	include	both	cabinet	members,	who	work	at	the	peak	of	
the	organization	on	the	political	frontline,	and	individuals	drafted	in	to	cover	short-term	
staff	shortages	at	all	levels.		Figure	1	illustrates	the	main	staff	groupings	in	the	
Commission	(see	also	Connolly	and	Kassim	2015:	Table	10.2).		
FIGURE	1	
A	further	complication	arises	from	the	fact	that	a	proportion	of	administrators	
and	assistants	are	on	temporary	contracts.	Thus,	a	distinction	between	permanent	and	
temporary	staff	cuts	across,	rather	than	coincides	neatly	with,	staff	groupings.	In	a	
differentiated	organization,	samples	need	to	be	constructed	with	considerable	care	if	
analyses	are	to	be	generalizable.	Reliance	on	a	single	staff	grouping	or	subgrouping	is	
likely	to	have	limited	value	at	best.	Moreover,	since	they	focus	largely	on	a	single	staff	
grouping	or	subgrouping,	existing	studies	cannot	register	or	measure	variation	between	
staff	groupings.	They	cannot	establish	whether	or	to	what	extent	the	beliefs,	values	and	
experiences	they	report	are	representative	of	the	Commission	workforce	as	a	whole.	
The	third	limitation	concerns	the	range	of	independent	variables	tested	in	earlier	
studies.	This	shortcoming	is	partly	related	to	the	narrowness	of	the	samples	on	which	
they	are	based	and	partly	their	homogeneneity,	which	leaves	the	influences	shared	
between	individuals	within	them	undetected.	Furthermore,	the	existing	literature	places	
a	strong	emphasis	on	some	variables,	such	as	nationality,	but	it	omits	other	potentially	
important	socialising	factors,	such	as	work	location,	staff	grouping,	horizontal	mobility,	
and	cabinet	experience.	
Informed	by	analysis	of	a	new	dataset	covering	the	entire	workforce,	this	article	
addresses	these	limitations.	It	aims	to	advance	knowledge	in	three	ways.	First,	it	argues	
in	favour	of	a	broader	definition	of	the	possible	organizational	values	that	may	result	
from	working	in	the	Commission.	Second,	based	on	this	new	empirical	evidence,	the	
article	shows	for	the	first	time	that	the	beliefs	and	values	of	Commission	employees	
vary	between	staff	categories,	sometimes	significantly.	Third,	the	paper	challenges	the	
dominant	orthodoxy	in	the	literature;	namely,	that	pre-recruitment	socialization	is	
decisive	in	shaping	the	values	and	beliefs	of	Commission	staff.	The	richness	of	the	
dataset	makes	it	possible	to	test	the	beliefs	and	values	of	Commission	staff	in	a	diverse	
range	of	settings,	and	therefore	to	detect	how	a	wider	set	of	experiences	may	influence	
what	they	believe.	
This	article	thereby	aims	to	contribute	to	the	literature	in	two	ways:	by	
highlighting	and	addressing	three	major	shortcomings	of	the	existing	literature;	and	by	
providing	a	new	approach	to	the	above	debate,	new	knowledge	of	what	staff	across	the	
Commission	believe,	and	a	new	understanding	of	the	experiences	that	shape	the	beliefs	
of	Commission	staff.	Although	the	issue	of	whether	its	power	has	waxed	or	waned	is	
keenly	disputed,	the	Commission	retains	a	central	position	in	the	EU	system.	By	offering	
insights	into	whether	and	if	so,	to	what	extent,	working	in	the	Commission	affects	the	
beliefs,	values	and	outlooks	of	its	staff,	this	article	both	advances	understanding	of	an	
important	institution,	and	contributes	to	long-standing	debates	concerning	the	
socializing	power	of	international	institutions.	
The	discussion	that	follows	is	organized	into	two	parts.	The	first	reviews	how	
scholarship	on	the	beliefs	of	Commission	staff	has	developed,	summarizes	the	
approaches	taken	by	existing	studies,	and	offers	a	critical	analysis	of	the	literature.	The	
second	introduces	‘Facing	the	Future’	--	the	project	from	which	the	dataset	analysed	in	
this	article	is	drawn	--	and	discusses	how	it	addresses	the	limitations	of	existing	
scholarship.	It	describes	the	data	that	were	collected	for	the	project,	as	well	as	the	
questions	posed	in	the	survey,	and	outlines	the	empirical	model	and	hypotheses.	After	
setting	out	the	findings,	it	examines	the	significance	of	the	research	for	earlier	studies,	
and	considers	the	wider	implications	of	the	results	for	the	field.	
		
EU	staff,	beliefs	and	the	existing	literature	
What	the	staff	of	EU	institutions	believe	has	been	an	issue	of	major	concern	in	the	post-
war	institutionalization	of	Europe.	While	Jean	Monnet	argued	that	the	European	
administration	should	be	composed	of	dedicated	technocrats,	Haas	defined	integration	
as	‘the	process	whereby	political	actors	in	several	distinct	national	settings	are	
persuaded	to	shift	their	loyalties,	expectations	and	political	activities	towards	a	new	
centre	(1968:	16)	and	argued	that	the	dissemination	of	values	from	the	Commission	was	
a	key	dynamic	in	advancing	that	process.	Three	decades	later,	heralding	the	rise	of	a	
social	constructivist	perspective	in	the	study	of	the	EU,	Christiansen	et	al	(1999:	529)	
inferred	that	since	‘European	integration	has	a	transformative	impact	on	the	European	
state	system	and	its	constituent	units	.	.	.	it	is	reasonable	to	assume	that	in	the	process	
agents’	identity	and	subsequently	their	interests	have	equally	changed’.	
												An	early	assumption	was	that	Commission	officials	would	be	‘supranationalist’	in	
outlook.	Although	the	specific	content	of	the	term	often	went	undefined,	the	view	that	
Commission	personnel	share	a	particular	outlook	associated	with	the	organization’s	
mission	came	to	be	shared	by	scholars	working	from	different	theoretical	perspectives,	
including	rational	choice	(see,	e.g.,	Pollack	2003,	Jupille	2004,	Franchino	2007).	Even	
though	this	view	has	been	contested	by	arguments	that	the	Commission	is	better	
conceptualized	as	a	‘multi-organization’	(Cram	1993)	than	a	monolith,	the	belief	that	the	
Commission	is	populated	by	competence-maximizers	persists	as	a	convenient	
simplification.	
In	a	new	wave	of	scholarship	emerging	in	the	late	1990s	scholars	put	
assumptions	made	by	the	classic	literature,	many	of	which	had	become	accepted	
wisdoms	beyond	the	academy	(Kassim	et	al	2013:	chs	1,	3),	to	empirical	test.	Whereas	
the	earlier	literature	had	tended	to	‘black	box’	the	Commission,	the	new	generation	of	
scholars	sought	to	penetrate	its	inner	workings	and	to	explore	the	beliefs	of	its	
personnel.	Though	they	agreed	that	the	Commission	was	not	a	‘citadel	of	
supranationalism’	(Dehousse	and	Thompson	2012),	these	scholars	adopted	different	
explanatory	perspectives.	Three	main	schools	emerged	--	pre-recruitment	socialization,	
post-recruitment	socialization,	and	positional	advantage	–	as	summarized	in	Table	1.	
		
TABLE	1	
		
Pre-recruitment	socialization	
Based	on	the	pioneering	work	of	Hooghe,	this	first	school	contends	that	pre-recruitment	
influences	are	decisive.	Arguing	that	‘[O]ur	understanding	of	European	integration	
remains	poor	at	best,	and	possibly	mistaken,	if	we	fail	to	account	for	the	motivations	
and	opinions	of	key	position	holders	in	the	European	institutions’	(1999:	436),	Hooghe	
sought	to	examine	the	orientations	of	senior	officeholders	in	the	Commission.	Her	
conclusion,	tested	against	three	datasets	collected	between	1995	and	2008,	is	that	
‘international	socialization’	–	experience	within	the	Commission	--	has	a	relatively	
limited	effect	on	the	role	conceptions	of	senior	officeholders	and	that	senior	
officeholders	acquire	their	beliefs	and	values	in	their	home	state	before	entering	the	
Commission	(Hooghe	1999a,	1999b,	2002,	2005,	2012).	
Why	does	national	background	matter	more	than	other	influences?	Hooghe	
offers	two	explanations.	The	first	is	that	formative	experiences	occur	early	in	life.	Since	
Commission	employees	typically	enter	the	organization	in	their	early	thirties,	their	
values	have	already	been	shaped.	The	second	is	that,	because	they	work	in	a	political	
context	where	territoriality	is	key	marker	of	interest	and	mobilization,	national	cues	are	
reinforced	when	Commission	staff	interact	with	representatives	of	the	European	
Parliament,	the	Council,	and	other	actors.	The	key	national	variables	are	the	type	of	
territorial	order,	i.e.	unitary	or	federal,	size,	and	whether	the	staff	member	was	
employed	as	a	civil	servant.	
Hooghe’s	central	findings	have	recently	been	re-asserted	by	Bes	(2013).	After	
making	a	number	of	refinements,	such	as	re-working	Hooghe’s	original	typology,	
filtering	the	sample	to	avoid	double-counting,	and	remodelling	the	measurement	of	
respondent	choices	–	Bes	finds,	first,	that	national	background	and	political	ideology	are	
the	best	predictors	among	the	variables	tested	and,	second,	that	variables	associated	
with	post-recruitment	socialization	have	little	or	no	impact.	Suvarierol	et	al	(2013)	also	
find	in	favour	of	a	pre-recruitment	socialization	approach.	However,	because	they	
extend	the	term	to	include	the	processes	of	recruitment	to	EU	institutions,	they	
contradict	Hooghe’s	emphasis	on	national	experience.				
		
Organizational	socialization	
The	second	perspective,	developed	by	Trondal	(2001,	2006,	2007,	2008),	sometimes	
with	co-authors	(Trondal	et	al	2008;	Murdoch	and	Trondal	2013),	contests	the	pre-
socialization	approach	and	insists	that	working	for	the	Commission	does	have	an	
influence.	Adopting	a	‘least	likely	case’	approach,	Trondal	tests	the	Commission’s	
socializing	capacity	by	examining	the	loyalties	or	role	conceptions	of	seconded	national	
experts	(SNEs).	The	assumption	is	that,	since	their	beliefs	are	forged	in	their	home	states	
and	they	will	return	to	their	national	administrations,	SNEs	are	unlikely	to	exhibit	
‘supranationalist’	values	unless	socialized	by	their	experience	in	the	Commission	
(Trondal	2001:	4;	2007:	1112;	2010:	75).	
Drawing	on	survey	and	interview	data,	Trondal	(2007:1112)	finds	that	‘SNEs	
evoke	multiple	roles’,	departmental,	epistemic	and	supranational.	His	analysis	‘reveal[s]	
that	actor-level	supranationalism	among	SNEs	reflect	(i)	processes	of	re-socialization	
inside	the	Commission,	(ii)	the	organizational	composition	of	the	Commission	and	(iii)	
organizational	incompatibilities	between	the	Commission	and	domestic	government	
institutions’.	As	such,	they	‘challenge	a	core	claim	of	Hooghe	(2005)’;	namely,	‘that	
socialization	of	Commission	officials	mainly	occur[s]	at	the	national	level	and	not	inside	
the	Commission	apparatus’	(ibid).		
Combining	‘insights	from	middle-range	social	constructivist,	institutionalist	and	
organization	theory	approaches’,	Trondal	(2007)	develops	‘a	composite	institutional	
approach’	to	explain	the	variance	in	actor	level	supranationalism.	According	to	the	first,	
post-recruitment	socialization	depends	on	the	length	of	time	an	employee	works	in	the	
Commission	and/or	on	the	intensity	of	interaction	with	Commission	colleagues.	The	
second	contends	that,	since	the	cognitive	scripts	they	encounter	when	they	join	the	
Commission	challenge	SNEs	to	shift	from	an	old	to	a	new	role	conception,	SNEs	whose	
new	area	of	responsibility	differs	markedly	are	more	likely	to	be	strongly	
‘supranationalist’.	
		
Positional	advantage	
Public	choice	theory	is	the	inspiration	for	a	third	perspective,	which	explains	the	beliefs	
exhibited	by	bureaucrats	in	terms	of	self-interest.	Hooghe	tests	four	hypotheses	derived	
from	public	choice	assumptions:	that	officials	in	powerful	Directorate-Generals	(DGs)	
are	likely	to	be	more	‘supranational’	because	regulatory	and	financial	authority	will	
strengthen	them	(Hooghe	2002:	104);	that	staff	from	countries	that	are	net	beneficiaries	
from	EU	membership	are	likely	to	be	more	‘supranational’;	that	EU	civil	servants	from	
countries	with	strong	informal	(i.e.	national)	networks	in	Brussels	are	likely	to	be	more	
intergovernmental,	since	these	networks	are	a	resource	for	professional	success	(2001:	
105);	and	that	SNEs	are	likely	to	be	more	intergovernmental,	since	they	owe	their	
selection	to	national	governments	and	will	return	home	after	their	temporary	spell	in	
the	Commission	(2001:	106).	She	finds	evidence	for	the	first	three	in	her	2002	book,	but	
not	her	2005	article.	Bauer	(2012)	and	Kassim	et	al	(2013:	ch	8),	meanwhile,	also	find	
evidence	that	utility-maximization,	understood	in	terms	of	career	prospects	and	
departmental	interests,	is	an	important	explanatory	variable,	but	their	findings	are	
linked	explicitly	to	attitudes	to	reform	and	they	do	not	suggest	that	utility	maximization	
applies	more	generally.	
Murdoch	and	Geys	(2012)	develop	a	hybrid	approach,	which	assumes	the	
coexistence	of	multiple	logics	of	social	action.	Following	Trondal	(2006),	they	argue	that	
the	values	of	SNEs	are	shaped	partly	by	the	role	they	play	within	the	Commission	and	
how	strongly	they	identity	with	four	behavioural	roles	(epistemic,	sectoral,	national	and	
supranational)	and	partly	an	instrumental	calculation,	which	can	be	measured	in	terms	
of	an	explicit	aim	to	further	their	career	possibilities.	They	find	evidence	that	the	
behaviour	of	SNEs	is	influenced	both	by	role	expectations	and	cost-benefit	calculations.	
		
Critical	reflection	
Although	it	has	significantly	advanced	understanding	of	the	Commission	and	its	staff,	
the	new	empirically-based	literature	has	three	important	weaknesses.	First,	it	pays	
surprisingly	little	attention	to	the	definition	of	the	dependent	variable.	Authors	rarely	
offer	a	justification	for	their	preferred	formulation	or,	despite	different	usages,	discuss	
the	relative	merits	of	different	definitions.	Not	do	they	consider	the	downsides	of	their	
favoured	option.	For	Hooghe	(1999a,	1999b,	2005,	2011),	‘supranationalism’	is	an	
orientation	towards	European	integration,	while	for	Trondal	it	is	based	on	‘loyalty	to	the	
Commission	and	to	the	Director	General’	(2006,	2007).	Yet	the	first	fails	to	distinguish	
between	‘federalists’	and	supporters	of	the	‘Community	method’,	and	does	not	explain	
why	preference	for	a	particular	form	of	governance	should	be	taken	as	a	test	for	
determining	whether	working	for	the	Commission	leaves	it	mark	on	an	individual.	In	
respect	of	the	second,	meanwhile,	no	explanation	is	offered	for	why	felt	affiliation	to	a	
senior	manager	should	be	considered	a	measure	of	‘supranationalism’.	
Moreover,	the	definitions	of	‘supranational’	in	the	new	literature	do	not	always	
map	easily	or	obviously	onto	the	values	expressed	by	respondents.	The	pre-recruitment	
socialization	approach	constructs	its	measure	from	responses	to	two	proxies:	whether	
member	states	should	be	the	central	pillars	of	the	EU;	and	whether	the	Commission	
should	be	the	government	of	the	EU	(Hooghe	2005:	889).	Yet	deriving	a	measure	of	
‘supranationalism’	from	these	two	propositions	is	problematic.	It	is	not	only	unclear	that	
they	generate	a	meaningful	continuum,	but	it	is	debatable	whether	the	results	of	four	
distinct	binary	choices	can	be	read	as	a	single	four-way	choice.		
Second,	existing	studies	are	based	on	data	from	small	unrepresentative	
samples.		The	pre-recruitment	perspective,	for	example,	draws	on	a	small	number	of	
‘senior	officials’,	either	senior	managers	or	heads	of	cabinet.	Both	are	small	sub-
populations,	and	each	a	sub-grouping	of	a	wider	staff	category	--	administrators	in	the	
case	of	senior	managers	and	temporary	agents	in	the	case	of	heads	of	cabinet.	
Moreover,	even	senior	managers	can	be	on	temporary	contracts,	so	are	not	necessarily	
‘permanent	officials’,	while	heads	of	cabinet,	although	employed	as	temporary	agents	
for	the	period	that	they	are	in	the	Commissioner’s	private	office,	may	be	seconded	
internally	from	among	the	Commission’s	permanent	staff	or	may	come	from	outside	the	
organization.	SNEs,	by	contrast,	who	feature	centrally	in	the	writings	of	the	post-
recruitment	school,	constitute	only	around	2	per	cent	of	the	Commission’s	workforce.	
Neither	school	can	explore	differences	between	staff	groupings,	or	measure	variation	
across	the	Commission	workforce,	limitations	that	severely	inhibit	the	granularity	of	
their	findings	and	the	generalizability	of	their	conclusions.	
Third,	although	the	existing	literature	examines	the	effects	of	a	significant	range	
of	independent	variables,	important	potential	influences,	such	as	staff	grouping,	
contractual	status,	workplace	location,	and	the	number	of	DGs	in	which	an	employee	
has	served,	remain	untested.	It	is	not	possible	from	reading	Hooghe	(1999,	2002,	2005),	
for	example,	to	know	whether	permanent	staff	are	likely	to	be	more	‘supranational’	
than	those	on	temporary	contracts.	Trondal,	meanwhile,	as	Bes	notes	(2013:	6),	
highlights	the	importance	of	international	education	as	a	source	of	pre-recruitment	
socialization,	but	does	not	always	test	for	its	impact.	The	failure	to	include	these	
variables,	combined	with	the	tendency	to	concentrate	on	a	single	staff	category	or	
segment	of	staff,	restricts	the	ability	to	detect	the	impact	of	potential	influences	and	
limits	the	range	of	organizational	experience	that	is	tested.		
In	summary,	existing	studies	offer	important,	but	partial,	insights	into	the	beliefs	
of	the	Commission	workforce.	Different	definitions	of	‘supranationalism’	are	used,	but	
never	critically	examined,	the	representativeness	of	the	populations	investigated	is	
questionable,	and	key	variables,	most	notably	staff	grouping,	but	also	location,	are	
untested.	‘Facing	the	Future’	was	designed	to	address	and,	where	possible,	to	transcend	
these	limitations.	
		
A	new	approach	to	what	Commission	staff	believe	
Against	the	background	of	this	debate,	and	using	the	opportunity	afforded	by	the	scope	
and	scale	of	the	new	dataset,	this	article	has	three	main	ambitions.	The	first	is	to	
examine	the	values	of	Commission	staff	across	the	organization	--	in	all	staff	categories	
and	at	all	levels.	The	aim	is	to	map	the	extent	to	which	similar	views	are	shared	by	
employees	across	different	staff	groupings.		
The	second,	revisiting	the	central	question	of	the	Commission’s	socializing	
power,	is	to	establish	whether	the	experience	of	working	in	the	Commission	has	an	
impact	on	the	beliefs	and	values	of	staff.	The	dataset	offers	the	opportunity	to	assess	
whether	the	claims	made	by	the	three	schools	hold	when	tested	against	all	staff	
categories.	Because	it	is	drawn	from	a	sample	that	is	representative	of	the	Commission	
workforce	in	several	key	respects,	it	allows	aspects	of	organizational	experience	that	
may	affect	the	beliefs	and	values	of	Commission	employees	to	be	assessed	for	the	first	
time,	and	new	independent	variables	to	be	tested,	in	addition	to	re-running	hypotheses	
from	the	existing	literature.	
Third,	the	article	introduces	a	broad	test	for	‘supranationalism’.	Alongside	a	
more	direct,	intuitive	and	precise	test	for	commitment	to	‘supranationalism’	as	a	form	
of	EU	governance,	the	article	includes	two	additional	measures.	It	extends	the	scope	of	
‘supranationalism’	to	include	a	wider	range	of	pro-European	sentiments	that	working	
for	the	Commission	might	engender.	Used	with	a	larger	and	more	representative	
sample,	this	makes	it	possible	to	explore	whether	‘supranationalism’	finds	varied	forms	
of	expression	among	the	sub-populations	of	the	organization.		
		
Data,	method	and	hypotheses	
The	research	team	used	an	online	survey	to	solicit	the	beliefs	of	staff,	as	well	as	
information	about	their	educational	and	professional	backgrounds,	employment	
histories,	work	location,	staff	grouping,	gender	and	nationality.	Although	interviews	and	
focus	groups	were	also	conducted	as	part	of	‘Facing	the	Future’,	this	article	draws	on	
data	from	the	survey	only.	A	link	(in	English,	French	and	German)	was	emailed	to	31,280	
members	of	Commission	staff	on	21	March	2014.	The	survey	remained	open	for	four	
weeks	and	was	completed	by	5,545	respondents,	representing	a	response	rate	of	17.7	
per	cent.	The	achieved	sample	was	benchmarked	against	the	Commission	population.	
The	resulting	weighted	sample	is	representative	of	the	Commission	workforce	by	staff	
category,	location,	gender,	cohort	and	national	origins	by	old	(i.e.	pre-2004)	or	new	(i.e.	
2004	or	after)	member	state,	detailed	in	Appendix	Figures	1a-1d.	
	‘Supranationalism’	was	investigated	using	three	different	questions	or	
measures.		The	rationale	was	that	an	expanded	definition	would	make	it	possible	to	
capture	different	ways	in	which	‘supranational’	commitment	can	be	expressed.	The	first	
sought	to	investigate	individuals’	preferred	vision	of	the	EU.	Asking	staff	‘Where	would	
you	place	yourself	on	the	question	of	European	integration?’,	it	invited	respondents	to	
locate	themselves	on	an	eleven-point	scale	where	0	represents	‘a	union	of	sovereign	
states’	and	10	‘an	EU	supranational	state’.	Respondents	were	thus	able	to	express	their	
views	in	a	form	that	yielded	immediately	reportable	values.	
The	second	question	focused	on	motivation.	The	rationale	was	that	asking	staff	
about	their	reason	for	working	for	the	Commission	would	prompt	respondents	to	reveal	
whether	the	opportunity	to	contribute	towards	building	Europe	was	what	motivates	
them.	Asking	‘Why	did	you	choose	to	follow	a	career	in	the	Commission?’,	respondents	
were	offered	a	series	of	options	–	‘working	in	an	international	environment’,	
‘commitment	to	Europe’,	‘competitive	remuneration’,	‘job	stability’,	‘commitment	to	a	
particular	policy	area’	–	and	invited	to	indicate	whichever	applied	to	them.			
												Inspired	by	the	classic	public	administration	literature	(Aberbach	et	al	1981),	the	
third	question	asked	respondents	about	their	role	conceptions	as	Commission	
employees.	The	idea	was	to	test	whether,	and	if	so	to	what	extent,	staff	members	see	
their	daily	work	in	the	Commission	as	advancing	the	European	idea.	Respondents	were	
presented	the	proposition,	‘As	an	employee	of	the	Commission,	I	see	my	role	above	all	
else,	as	working	for	the	interests	of	the	EU’	and	asked	whether	they	strongly	agreed,	
agreed,	neither	agreed	nor	disagreed,	disagreed,	strongly	disagreed,	or	did	not	know.	
Following	Suvarierol	et	al	(2013),	the	phrasing	was	taken	directly	from	the	Staff	
Regulations,	which	define	the	rights	and	obligations	of	personnel	working	for	the	EU	
institutions.	By	framing	‘role	conception’	in	terms	of	the	individual	rather	than	the	
organization	this	question	sought	to	discover	how	staff	members	see	their	job	rather	
than	simply	inviting	a	re-affirmation	of	the	Commission’s	vocation.	
The	use	of	three	measures	allowed	researchers	to	capture	a	broader	range	of	
indicators	than	permitted	by	the	single	dimensional	approach	taken	in	the	existing	
literature.	It	also	made	it	possible	to	test	whether,	and	if	so,	to	what	extent,	responses	
to	the	three	questions	co-vary.	If	they	do,	it	would	follow	that	the	three	formulations	
are	equally	valuable	as	measures	of	adherence	to	the	Commission’s	organizational	
values.	If	they	do	not,	it	would	show	that	the	definition	of	the	dependent	variable	does	
matter	and	that	scholars	need	to	justify	their	particular	choice.	
The	results	of	the	2014	‘Facing	the	Future’	survey	questions	are	shown	in	Figures	
2,	3	and	4.	Summarising	briefly,	the	average	on	the	first	question,	‘Where	would	you	
place	yourself	on	the	question	of	European	integration?’,	was	5.85	and	the	standard	
deviation	2.7.	All	eleven	points	on	the	scale	were	used.	The	modal	response	is	7	
followed	by	8	--	1017	and	900	out	of	5107	respectively.	There	is	some	variation	by	staff	
category,	with	managers	more	likely	to	locate	themselves	towards	the	‘EU	as	a	
supranational	state’,	and	a	big	difference	between	men	and	women,	with	men	leaning	
more	strongly	towards	the	supranational	end	of	the	scale.	On	the	second	question,	
‘Why	did	you	choose	a	career	in	the	Commission?’,	the	most	frequently	cited	motivation	
was	‘commitment	to	Europe’		(61	per	cent).	Men	were	more	likely	than	women	and	
administrators,	especially	managers,	more	likely	than	respondents	in	other	staff	
categories	to	give	this	response.	On	the	third	question,	no	fewer	than	90	per	cent	of	
staff	agree	or	strongly	agree	that	‘As	an	employee	of	the	Commission,	I	see	my	role	
above	all	else,	as	working	for	the	interests	of	the	EU’.	Contract	agents,	staff	from	the	
EU13	and	recent	recruits	are	slightly	less	likely	to	agree.	
		
FIGURES	2,	3	and	4	
		
In	the	next	stage	of	the	analysis,	a	series	of	hypotheses	derived	from	the	three	schools	
described	above	were	tested	with	a	view	to	determining	the	extent	to	which	pro-
European	organizational	values	vary	by	national	background,	pre-Commission	
socialization,	experience	within	the	Commission.	To	retain	comparability	with	earlier	
literature,	the	explanatory	variables	were	similar	to	those	used	in	previous	studies.	
Appendix	Table	1	includes	a	full	list	of	definitions,	sources	and	descriptive	statistics.	
Kassim	et	al.	(2013:	19-30,	especially	Table	1.2)	and	Hooghe	(2002)	discuss	the	context	
and	operationalization	of	key	explanatory	variables.	The	key	explanatory	variables	
examined	are	as	follows:	
o ‘National	background’	is	proxied	by	two	country	specific	variables	(degree	of	
federal	polity,	using	the	Hooghe,	Marks,	Schakel	(2010)	Regional	Authority	Index;	
and	country	size),	based	on	the	survey	respondent’s	main	nationality,	an	
indicator	of	whether	the	individual	has	multiple	nationalities,	and	whether	he	or	
she	was	educated	abroad.		
o ‘Pre-recruitment	socialisation’	is	captured	by	pre-Commission	professional	
experience	in	national	administration	or	the	private	sector.		
o ‘Post-recruitment	socialisation’	is	measured	by	variables	used	in	previous	studies	
--	years	of	service	in	the	Commission,	staff	category,	experience	of	horizontal	
mobility	across	DGs,	experience	of	a	political	role	(i.e.	service	in	a	cabinet)	–	to	
which	have	been	added	two	further	measures.	First,	unlike	previous	studies,	
which	focused	exclusively	on	Commission	staff	working	in	Brussels,	‘Facing	the	
Future’	looked	at	the	experience	employees	based	outside	Brussels.	Hence,	
indicators	are	included	for	location	in	Luxembourg,	and	in	Commission	
representations	or	EU	delegations	internationally.	Following	reports	of	higher	
levels	of	socialization	at	headquarters	in	private	sector	organisations	that	are	
based	at	multiple	sites,	location	outside	Brussels	is	included	as	a	test	for	an	‘HQ	
effect’	in	the	context	of	an	international	public	administration.	Second,	levels	of	
engagement	in	the	workplace	are	a	key	indicator	of	experience	relevant	to	post-
recruitment	socialisation,	but	are	possibly	linked	to	an	increased	association	with	
the	values	of	the	organisation.		Following	the	Commission	(2013),	an	
engagement	index	was	constructed	to	capture	the	experience	of	working	in	the	
Commission	using	responses	to	six	questions	as	follows:	‘I	have	a	clear	
understanding	of	what	is	expected	from	me	at	work’;	‘My	colleagues	are	
committed	to	doing	quality	work’;	‘I	have	recently	received	recognition	or	praise	
for	good	work’;	‘My	manager	seems	to	care	for	me	as	a	person’;	‘I	have	the	
information,	material	and	resources	to	my	job	well’;	‘At	work,	my	opinions	seem	
to	count’;	‘My	line	manager	helps	me	to	identify	my	training	and	development	
needs’.		
o ‘Positional	advantage’	is	proxied	according	to	the	main	responsibilities	of	the	DG	
in	which	each	member	of	staff	works.	A	‘power	DG’	is	defined	according	to	
competencies	based	on	formal	Treaty	rules	(Börzel	2005);	a	‘management	DG’	
has	important	internal	responsibilities.	
o Controls	for	economic	and	social	philosophies,	educational	background,	
nationality	and	gender	were	included.	
The	models	include	a	large	number	of	explanatory	variables,	some	of	which	may	be	
correlated	with	each	other.	To	test	for	multicollinearity,	the	extent	of	correlations	was	
examined	using	a	correlation	matrix	for	all	explanatory	variables	included	in	the	model.	
Although	some	variables	are	related,	none	are	highly	correlated.	The	highest	
correlations	were:	+0.629	between	working	at	the	Joint	Research	Centre	(JRC)	and	
holding	a	management	position;	and	-0.549	between	the	Regional	Authority	Index	and	
holding	nationality	of	one	of	the	EU13.		The	robustness	of	these	findings	was	tested	with	
respect	to	composition	of	the	sample,	the	estimation	method,	and	by	excluding	the	
explanatory	variables	that	are	more	highly	correlated	from	the	model.		The	results,	
available	on	request	from	the	authors,	show	the	findings	are	not	affected.	
		
The	hypotheses	are	as	follows:	
		
H1:	Pre-recruitment	socialization	-	national	background.	Staff	from	federal	countries	are	
more	used	to	delegated	authority,	those	from	smaller	countries	may	have	a	
stronger	appreciation	of	the	transnational	economies	of	scale	generated	by	the	
EU,	those	with	international	education	experience	or	multiple	nationalities	are	
more	likely	to	have	international	outlooks.	
		
H2:	Pre-recruitment	socialization	–	professional	background.	Staff	with	experience	in	the	
private	sector	are	likely	to	be	more	international	in	outlook;	those	with	experience	
in	national	administration	are	less	likely.	
		
H3:	Post-recruitment	socialization.	Those	in	more	senior	positions,	with	longer	service	or	
with	broader	experience	within	the	Commission,	are	likely	to	have	a	stronger	
identification	with	the	organisation.	Those	working	in	Brussels	may	have	a	
stronger	identification	with	the	core	mission	of	the	Commission.		Staff	who	are	
strongly	engaged	in	their	work	are	more	likely	to	associate	with	the	organisational	
values.	
		
H4:	Positional	advantage:	staff	based	in	DGs	that	have	strong	competencies	are	more	
likely	to	be	‘supranationalist’.	
		
The	nature	of	the	data	–	many	individuals	working	in	the	same	DG;	staff	from	the	same	
country	–	requires	account	to	be	taken	of	the	possible	correlations	within	DG	or	
nationality	and	the	consequent	effects	upon	the	standard	errors.		With	outcome	
variables	and	many	explanatory	variables	measured	at	the	individual	level	(level	1),	the	
DG	level	(level	2)	and	the	member	state	level	(level	3),	it	is	necessary	to	estimate	3-level	
regression	and	logit	models.		The	DG	level	was	never	significant	and	the	member	state	
level	was	only	significant	when	using	the	first	measure.	
		
Our	dependent	variables	are	as	follows:	
o ‘Where	would	you	place	yourself	on	the	question	of	European	integration?’	(0	-	
Union	of	sovereign	states,	10	-	EU	supranational	state)	is	modelled	using	a	multi-
level	regression	model.	
o ‘Why	did	you	choose	to	follow	a	career	in	the	Commission?’		Respondents	
answering	‘commitment	to	Europe’	is	modelled	as	a	multi-level	binary	
dependent	variable,	where	1	=	‘Yes’	and	0	=	all	other	responses.	
o ‘As	an	employee	of	the	Commission,	I	see	my	role	above	all	else,	as	working	for	
the	interests	of	the	EU’	is	modelled	as	a	multi-level	binary	dependent	variable,	
where	1	–	strongly	agree	or	agree	and	0	=	all	other	responses.	
		
Estimated	coefficients	for	each	of	the	three	models	are	reported	in	Table	2.	As	both	
regression	and	binary	dependent	variable	models	are	used,	the	coefficients	are,	of	
course,	not	directly	comparable.	
TABLE	2		
Findings	
The	findings	for	each	of	these	hypotheses	are	as	follows:	
		
H1:	Pre-recruitment	socialization	-	national	background.	The	results	for	the	three	
measures	confirm	that	national	background,	particularly	when	measured	by	an	
index	of	federalism	or	country	size,	is	important.		Staff	from	federal	polities	are	
more	likely	to	show	pro-European	preferences	across	all	three	measures:	belief,	
motivation	and	role	conception.		There	are	two	countries	–	Germany	and	Belgium	
–	where	regional	authority	is	significantly	higher	than	elsewhere	in	the	
EU28.		These	countries	are	also	important	in	other	ways:	Germany	is	the	largest	
country	and	Belgium	has	the	highest	number	of	its	nationals	working	in	the	
Commission.		When	Germany	and	Belgium	are	excluded,	the	finding	that	staff	
from	more	federal	polities	hold	stronger	supranationalist	views	is	unchanged,	but	
the	result	on	country	size	is	no	longer	significant.		Staff	educated	outside	their	
nation	state	are	more	likely	to	exhibit	pro-European	leanings	on	motivation	and	
actor	role	conception	only.	
		
H2:	Pre-recruitment	socialization	–	professional	background.	Staff	with	national	
administrative	experience	are	less	likely	to	show	pro-European	preferences	in	
terms	of	belief	and	actor	role	conception,	but	are	more	likely	so	to	do	on	
motivation.	Respondents	with	private	sector	experience	are	more	likely	to	exhibit	
pro-European	leanings	on	‘commitment	to	Europe’	and	‘working	in	the	interests	
of	Europe’.	
		
H3:	Post-recruitment	socialization.	Experience	in	the	Commission	is	strongly	significant	
on	the	first	and	third	measures,	though	the	effect	is	non-linear.		More	recent	
recruits	are	more	likely	to	support	a	supranational	view	of	European	integration	
but	the	effect	diminishes	with	years	of	service.		Staff	with	longer	careers	in	the	
Commission	were	more	likely	to	agree	that	they	saw	themselves	as	working	in	the	
interests	of	the	EU,	though	again	the	effect	diminishes	with	years	of	service.		
Seniority	and	staff	category	matter	in	all	three	models,	though	not	in	the	same	
way.	AD	officials	and	managers	are	more	likely	to	support	a	supranational	vision	of	
integration	and	were	motivated	by	a	‘commitment	to	Europe’	when	joining	the	
Commission,	but	assistants,	contract	agents	and,	particularly,	SNEs	prefer	a	union	
of	sovereign	states	and	were	less	likely	to	have	been	motivated	by	a	‘commitment	
to	Europe’.		Management	ADs	are	more	likely	than	non-management	ADs	to	have	
pro-European	leanings	in	motivation	and	role	conception.		However,	contract	and	
temporary	agents	were	more	likely	than	non-management	ADs	to	see	themselves	
as	working	in	the	interests	of	the	EU.	Since	their	preferences	concerning	European	
integration	and	their	motivations	for	joining	the	organization	were	so	different	
from	those	of	administrators,	working	for	the	Commission	appears	to	have	had	a	
socializing	effect.	
Location	also	emerges	as	a	factor.	Staff	based	in	Luxemburg	or	in	
representations	abroad	are	less	likely	than	those	in	Brussels	to	support	a	
supranational	view	of	European	integration	and	less	likely	to	have	joined	the	
Commission	due	to	‘commitment	to	Europe’.		Since	roles	are	similar	and	some	
DGs	(for	example,	ECFIN	and	CNECT)	straddle	Brussels	and	Luxembourg,	the	
result	suggests	an	‘HQ	effect’.		There	is	little	support	for	the	argument	that	
preferences	are	shaped	by	different	experiences	with	the	Commission	–	
experience	in	a	cabinet	or	high	levels	of	horizontal	mobility	--	although	
respondents	who	have	worked	in	more	than	one	DG	are	more	likely	to	agree	
that	they	see	themselves	as	‘working	in	the	interests	of	the	EU’,	suggestive	that	a	
wider	range	of	experience	has	a	socializing	effect	in	terms	of	identifying	with	the	
key	mission.	Staff	who	are	engaged	in	their	work	are	more	likely	to	exhibit	pro-
European	organizational	values	across	all	three	measures.	
		
H4:	Positional	advantage.	No	evidence	is	found	that	staff	in	DGs	with	particular	
responsibilities	or	EU	competencies	are	likely	to	be	more	‘supranationalist’.	
		
Controls:	Respondents	with	post-graduate	qualifications	were	likely	to	show	
‘supranationalist’	preferences	across	all	three	measures:	belief,	motivation	and	
role	conception.		Staff	with	a	legal	or	political	science	education	are	more	‘pro-
European’	in	their	outlook	across	all	three	measures.		Those	with	more	
economically	liberal	philosophies	are	less	likely	to	hold	a	supranational	view	of	
European	integration	and	those	who	are	more	socially	conservative	are	less	likely	
to	be	‘pro-European’	across	all	three	measures.		Women	are	less	likely	to	be	‘pro-
European’	across	all	three	measures.		Finally,	staff	from	EU13	member	states	are	
more	likely	to	support	a	supranational	view	of	European	integration	and	to	see	
themselves	as	‘working	for	the	EU’	than	those	from	other	member	states.	
		
Discussion	
The	findings	show	that	the	beliefs	and	values	held	by	Commission	personnel	vary	
between	staff	groupings	–	the	first	time	that	data	making	the	detection	of	such	
differences	possible	has	been	available.	Although	important	in	itself,	this	result	has	
wider	significance.	It	underlines	the	value	of	representative	sampling	in	the	study	of	
complex	organizations	and	highlights	the	limitations	of	findings	based	on	data	drawn	
from	single	groupings	or	strata.	It	is	not	only	that,	in	the	absence	of	information	about	
all	staff	groupings,	the	extent	to	which	such	findings	can	be	generalized	cannot	be	
established	to	a	high	level	of	satisfaction,	but	that	investigating	a	single	grouping	limits	
the	range	of	experiences	that	can	be	tested.	In	other	words,	without	data	that	allows	
comparisons	between	staff	groupings,	it	is	not	possible	to	test	whether	membership	of	a	
particular	staff	grouping	is	itself	a	factor.	
												The	findings	also	demonstrate	the	value	of	a	broader	approach	to	
‘supranationalism’	than	typically	taken	in	the	existing	literature.	If	the	aim	is	to	
determine	the	impact	of	working	in	the	Commission,	it	is	important	to	countenance	the	
possibility	that	individuals	and	sub-groups	of	individuals	may	be	affected	in	different	
ways.	Some	may	develop	a	preference	for	a	particular	model	of	EU	governance,	some	a	
motivation	for	working	to	build	Europe,	and	others	a	role	conception.	That	different	
staff	groupings	score	higher	on	some	measures	than	others,	it	seems	reasonable	to	infer	
that	a	test	that	goes	beyond	a	single	dimension	is	necessary	to	capture	impact	on	beliefs	
and	values.	
												Finally,	the	combination	of	data	drawn	from	across	the	entire	Commission	
workforce	with	a	broader	test	for	‘supranationalism’,	produces	a	more	nuanced	picture	
than	existing	studies.	Whereas	the	pre-recruitment	socialization	school,	which	focuses	
on	officials,	argues	that	national	experiences	are	pre-dominant	and	post-recruitment	
socialization,	which	concentrates	on	SNEs,	that	working	in	the	Commission	has	an	effect,	
the	results	reported	above	show	that	both	are	important.	But	what	of	magnitude?		The	
range	of	difference	in	‘supranationalism’	(first	measure)	between	a	member	of	staff	
from	a	country	with	the	highest	and	lowest	level	of	federalism	is	+2	points,	between	the	
member	of	staff	with	the	shortest	and	longest	years	of	experience	in	the	Commission	
+1.72	points	and	between	a	non-management	AD,	an	AST,	temporary	agent,	contract	
agent	and	an	SNE	-0.49,	-0.58,	-0.67	and	-1.1	points	respectively.	While	not	quite	
squaring	the	circle,	the	results	underline	the	value	of	a	genuinely	representative	sample.	
		
Conclusion	
While	the	early	literature	on	the	beliefs	of	Commission	officials	was	characterised	by	
assumptions	or	speculative	theorising,	a	more	recent	scholarship	has	used	empirical	
evidence	to	test	from	a	variety	of	sub-disciplinary	perspectives	propositions	about	the	
beliefs	that	bureaucrats	hold.	Despite	the	important	advances	it	has	brought,	and	its	
marked	sophistication	in	relation	to	the	earlier	literature,	empirical	studies	of	the	
Commission’s	socializing	power	has	been	marked	by	three	shortcomings:	the	measures	
of	the	values	that	are	its	central	concern;	the	narrowness	of	the	sample	population	on	
which	studies	have	been	based;	and	the	range	of	variables	authors	have	been	able	to	
test.	
												Drawing	on	representative	data	of	scope	and	scale	that	has	not	been	available	
hitherto,	this	article	has	sought	to	address	these	shortcomings	and	to	advance	
understanding	of	the	beliefs	of	Commission	staff	and	the	influences	that	shape	them.	It	
has	introduced	new	and	more	intuitive	measures	of	‘supranationalism’.	It	has	mapped	
beliefs	across	all	Commission	staff	groups,	and	it	has	used	the	‘Facing	the	Future’	data	to	
test	existing	explanatory	variables	from	previous	studies,	as	well	as	new	variables	--	
most	notably,	staff	grouping.	
												More	broadly,	the	paper	has	sought	to	move	beyond	the	limitations	of	the	
existing	debate	and	to	deliver	three	important	findings.	First,	by	experimenting	with	
separate	and	discrete	measures	of	‘supranationalism’,	and	by	showing	that	responses	
do	not	always	co-vary,	it	has	shown	that	the	definition	used	in	empirical	surveys	does	
matter.	The	lesson	is	that	considerable	caution	needs	to	be	exercised	when	formulating	
questions	for	respondents,	interpreting	their	responses	as	values,	and	defining	the	
dependent	variable.	Second,	the	article	shows	that	the	beliefs	held	by	employees	vary	
across	different	staff	groupings,	often	significantly.	The	finding	that	levels	of	
commitment	to	‘supranationalism’	reinforces	the	point	that	generalizations	based	on	a	
narrow	sample	are	unlikely	to	be	robust.	While	the	views	of	administrators	tend	to	be	
unusual	compared	to	other	staff	groupings,	those	of	managers	and	especially	senior	
managers	–	a	subgrouping	of	administrators	--	are	even	more	atypical.	
Furthermore,	the	article	demonstrates	that,	when	controls	are	introduced	for	
national	background,	there	is	evidence	that	other	factors	still	play	a	role	in	shaping	
beliefs.	In	other	words	--	and	important,	since	it	challenges	the	conventional	wisdom	--	
post-recruitment	experience	in	the	Commission	does	have	an	influence.		National	
backgrounds	play	a	part,	but	working	in	the	organization	also	has	an	impact.	Analysis	of	
the	views	of	all	staff	groups	shows	that	proponents	of	the	two	main	theoretical	
perspectives	have	to	some	extent	been	arguing	past	each	other	–	an	eventuality	that	
was	not	discernable	when	only	the	beliefs	of	‘senior	managers’	or	SNEs	were	examined,	
but	that	international	institutions	do	have	a	socializing	influence	after	all.	One	of	the	
many	roads	to	international	norms	does	indeed	run	through	Brussels	
Finally,	the	study	has	wider	implications	for	research	on	EU	institutions	and	
other	international	bodies.	In	attempting	to	assess	the	socializing	power	of	institutions,	
a	research	programme	must	be	able	to	capture	the	multiple	ways	in	which	the	
experience	of	working	for	an	organization	can	have	a	cognitive	or	affective	impact	on	
individuals.	It	raises	questions	about	the	mechanisms	of	organizational	socialization,	the	
conditions	under	which	it	takes	place,	whether	some	individuals	are	more	susceptible,	
and	whether	some	organizations	succeed	better	than	others.	It	also	suggests	that	it	may	
be	worthwhile	to	revisit	whether	beliefs	influence	behaviour	or	affect	outcomes.	
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TABLE	1	Summary	of	previous	studies	of	the	European	Commission	
Author	 Period	 Sample	size		 Dependent	variable	and	method	 Commission	Staff	category	
Hooghe,	
1999a	and	
1999b	
1995-7	 106	Semi-structured	interviews	
− Factor	analysis:	officials	should	speak	for	general	EU	interest;	egalitarian/free	
market;	technocratic	or	democratic;	intergovernmentalism	or	
supranationalism	
− Supranationalism	based	on	3	questions	on	orientation	towards	European	
integration	
− Ordinary	Least	Squares	
Senior	officials	(Directors	
General,	Deputy	Directors	
General,	Directors,	Senior	
Advisors)	
Hooghe,	
2005	 2002	
198	=	105	(1997)	+	93	
(2002)	
Semi-structured	interviews	
− Supranationalism	derived	from:		‘The	Commission	should	be	the	government	
of	Europe’	and	‘Member	states	should	be	the	central	pillars	of	the	EU’	
− State	centric,	supranationalists,	institutional	pragmatists	
− Binary	choice	outcomes	
Senior	officials	and	Heads	of	
Cabinet	
Hooghe,	
2011	 2008	
1648	
Online	survey	
(130	senior	officials)	
AD	policy	officials	
Bes,	2013	
1995-7,	
2002,	
2008	
105	(1995-7),	93	(2002),	
130	(2008)	
− Revises	Hooghe	(2011)	typology:	state	centric,	leaning	state	centric,	
institutional	pragmatists,	leaning	supranationalists,	supranationalist		
− Ordered	logit	
Senior	officials	and	Heads	of	
Cabinet	
Trondal,	
2006	 2005	 71	(survey)	+	22	
(interview)	
− Four	loyalties:	intergovernmental,	supranational,	departmental,	epistemic			
− Perceptions	of	loyalty	towards	the	Commission	as	a	whole	and	towards	the	
Director	General	of	their	DG	and	attitude	change	
− Correlation	and	Ordinary	Least	Squares		
Seconded	National	Experts	from	
member	states,	Norway	and	
Iceland	Trondal,	
2007	 2005	
Bauer,	
2012	 2008	
707	
Online	survey	
− ‘We	would	like	to	ask	your	views	on	recent	administrative	reforms.	Thinking	
of	the	administrative	reforms	implemented	since	2000,	what	are	your	views	
on	the	following	statements?’	
− Principal	Component	Analysis	
− Ordinary	Least	Squares	
AD	policy	officials	who	joined	
the	Commission	before	2000	
Suvarierol,	
et	al	2013	 2005-11	
279	
Pooled	4	sources	
Interviews	and	surveys	
− Official	shall	carry	out	the	duties	assigned	to	him	objectively,	impartially	and	
in	keeping	with	his	duty	of	loyalty	to	the	Communities		
− Commission:	Serving	the	people	of	Europe	
− Agencies:	Working	for	us	
− Qualitative		
82	officials	in	Social	Regulation	
DGs	+	90	Dutch	Seconded	
National	Experts		+	67	agency	
staff	+	40	(management	board	
representatives,	agency	
directors)	
Murdoch	
and	Geys,	
2012	
2011	 452	Survey	
− Advance	career,	representation	of	the	Commission,	representation	of	
member	state.		How	much	emphasis	placed	on	best	interests	of	home	country	
when	putting	forward	a	proposal.		
− Logit	
Seconded	National	Experts	
	
FIGURE	1	European	Commission	workforce	by	staff	category	(2014)	
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FIGURE	2	‘Where	would	you	place	yourself	on	the	question	of	European	integration?’	
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FIGURE	4	‘As	an	employee	of	the	Commission,	I	see	my	role	above	all	else,	as	working	
for	the	interests	of	the	EU.’	
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TABLE	2	Summary	of	results	
Measure	
1	–	belief	
Mixed	effect,	multi-level	
regression	
2	–	motivation	
Mixed	effect,	multi-
level	logit	
3	–	role	conception	
Mixed	effect,	multi-level	
logit	
	 Coef	 St	Error	 Sig.	 Coef	 St	Error	 Sig.	 Coef	 St	Error	 Sig.	
National	background	
Federalism	index	 0.07	 0.01	 ***	 0.02	 0.00	 ***	 0.02	 0.01	 ***	
Country	size	 -0.13	 0.04	 ***	 0.12	 0.03	 ***	 0.01	 0.05	 	
Educated	outside	of	nation	state	 0.13	 0.09	 	 0.29	 0.08	 ***	 0.43	 0.13	 ***	
Multiple	nationality	 0.09	 0.14	 *	 0.19	 0.13	 	 0.31	 0.22	 	
Pre-recruitment	
socialisation		
National	administration	experience	 -0.17	 0.09	 *	 0.15	 0.08	 *	 -0.22	 0.12	 *	
Private	sector	experience	 0.14	 0.09	 	 0.27	 0.08	 ***	 0.22	 0.12	 *	
Post-recruitment	
socialisation	
Number	of	years	worked	in	the	Commission	 -0.08	 0.02	 ***	 -0.03	 0.02	 **	 0.16	 0.02	 ***	
Square	of	years	worked	in	the	Commission	 0.00	 0.00	 ***	 0.00	 0.00	 	 0.00	 0.00	 ***	
Management	AD	 -0.02	 0.15	 	 0.27	 0.14	 *	 0.62	 0.31	 **	
Non-management	AD	(reference)	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -	
AST	 -0.49	 0.11	 ***	 -0.40	 0.09	 ***	 0.12	 0.15	 	
Contract	agent	 -0.58	 0.15	 ***	 -0.65	 0.13	 ***	 0.36	 0.18	 **	
Temporary	agent	 -0.66	 0.31	 **	 -0.29	 0.27	 	 1.07	 0.49	 **	
SNE	 -1.26	 0.31	 ***	 -1.20	 0.26	 ***	 	 	 	
Brussels	(reference)	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -	
Luxemburg	 -0.32	 0.14	 **	 -0.21	 0.12	 *	 -0.39	 0.18	 **	
JRC	sites	 -0.56	 0.26	 **	 -0.16	 0.21	 	 -0.58	 0.34	 	
Delegation	 0.18	 0.22	 	 -0.01	 0.19	 	 -0.14	 0.29	 	
Representation	 -0.42	 0.33	 	 -0.25	 0.29	 	 -0.28	 0.47	 	
Location	-	Other	or	Prefer	not	to	say	 -0.17	 0.35	 	 -0.42	 0.29	 	 0.05	 0.45	 	
Engagement	Index	 0.42	 0.17	 **	 0.46	 0.14	 ***	 1.16	 0.22	 ***	
Has	Cabinet	experience	 0.05	 0.22	 	 0.19	 0.20	 	 1.16	 0.53	 **	
Worked	in	more	than	one	DG	 0.04	 0.09	 	 0.18	 0.08	 **	 0.25	 0.13	 	
Positional	advantage	
Works	in	DG	Power	 -0.04	 0.11	 	 -0.10	 0.10	 	 0.01	 0.16	 	
Works	in	DG	Management	 0.00	 0.17	 	 0.05	 0.14	 	 0.16	 0.25	 	
Controls	
Post	graduate	degree	 0.32	 0.10	 ***	 0.25	 0.08	 ***	 0.33	 0.13	 **	
Degree	(reference)	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -	
School	leaving	 0.38	 0.33	 	 0.07	 0.26	 	 -0.70	 0.47	 	
Vocational	 -0.19	 0.29	 	 0.26	 0.24	 	 -0.56	 0.36	 	
No	formal	qualification	 -0.99	 0.92	 	 0.62	 0.73	 	 0.00	 0.00	 	
Other	level		 0.22	 0.38	 	 -0.13	 0.30	 	 -0.73	 0.44	 *	
Business	or	Economics	 -0.39	 0.15	 ***	 -0.48	 0.14	 ***	 -0.36	 0.24	 	
STEMM	 -0.58	 0.16	 ***	 -0.70	 0.15	 ***	 -0.51	 0.24	 **	
Politics	(reference)	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -	
Law	 -0.06	 0.17	 	 0.13	 0.16	 ***	 -0.43	 0.26	 *	
Humanities	 -0.62	 0.16	 ***	 -0.71	 0.15	 ***	 -0.61	 0.25	 **	
Other	social	science	 -0.31	 0.25	 	 -0.62	 0.22	 ***	 -0.73	 0.34	 **	
Other	or	prefer	not	to	say	 -0.82	 0.32	 ***	 -0.76	 0.26	 ***	 0.21	 0.47	 	
Economic	philosophy	(low	-	govt	&	high	–	market)	 -0.09	 0.02	 ***	 -0.01	 0.02	 	 -0.03	 0.03	 	
Social	philosophy	(low	-	liberal	&	high	-	conservative)	 -0.09	 0.02	 ***	 -0.04	 0.01	 **	 -0.04	 0.02	 *	
Female	 -0.91	 0.09	 ***	 -0.32	 0.08	 ***	 -0.36	 0.12	 ***	
Gender,	prefer	not	to	say	 0.18	 0.42	 	 -0.29	 0.34	 	 -0.16	 0.55	 	
EU13	 0.65	 0.15	 ***	 -0.09	 0.12	 	 0.73	 0.19	 ***	
	 Constant	 6.67	 0.31	 ***	 0.55	 0.27	 **	 0.13	 0.41	 	
Random	effects		
Level	2	–	DG	 5.9e-13	 3.9e-12	 	 0.01	 0.01	 	 0.025	 0.046	 	
Level	3	–	Nationality	 0.298	 .074	 ***	 0.035	 0.04	 	 0.127	 0.106	 	
	 Residual	 5.83	 .14	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 Log-likelihood	 -9091.7008	 -2502.0865	 -1221.843	
	 Wald	χ2	 524.74	 358.91	 205.19	
*	significant	at	10%	(p<0.1),	**	significant	at	5%	(p<0.05)	and	***	significant	at	1%	(p<0.01).
APPENDIX	FIGURE	1a-1d	ECFTF	sample	benchmarked	against	the	Commission	population	
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APPENDIX	TABLE	1	Explanatory	variables	
	
	 	 Min	 Max	 Mean	 StDev	
National	
background	
Federalism	index:	Hooghe,	Marks,	Schakel	(2010).	 0	 29.4	 16.99	 9.177	
Country	size:	normalised	Eurostat	(2014)	 -0.78	 2.8	 0.834	 1.257	
Educated	outside	of	nation	state	 0	 1	 0.392	 0.488	
Multiple	nationality	 0	 1	 0.083	 0.276	
Pre-
recruitment	
socialisation		
National	administration	experience	 0	 1	 0.32	 0.47	
Private	sector	experience	 0	 1	 0.53	 0.50	
Post-
recruitment	
socialisation	
Years	working	in	the	Commission	 	 	 	 	
Number	of	years		 1	 54	 11.72	 8.69	
Square	of	years		 1	 2916	 212.9	 274.8	
Staff	grouping		 	 	 	 	
Management	AD		 0	 1	 0.08	 0.28	
Non-management	AD		 0	 1	 0.35	 0.48	
	
AST		 0	 1	 0.31	 0.46	
	
Contract	agent		 0	 1	 0.14	 0.35	
	
Temporary	agent		 0	 1	 0.02	 0.13	
	
SNE		 0	 1	 0.02	 0.14	
	 Location		 	 	 	 	
	
Brussels		 0	 1	 0.70	 0.46	
	
Luxemburg		 0	 1	 0.12	 0.32	
	
JRC	sites		 0	 1	 0.07	 0.26	
	
Delegation		 0	 1	 0.05	 0.21	
	
Representation		 0	 1	 0.01	 0.12	
	
Other/Prefer	not	to	say		 0	 1	 0.02	 0.13	
	
Engagement	Index:	Commission,	(2013)	 0.14	 1	 0.67	 0.25	
	 Commission	experience	 	 	 	 	
	
Cabinet	experience	 0	 1	 0.03	 0.18	
	
Worked	in	more	than	one	DG	 0	 1	 0.51	 0.50	
Positional	
advantage	
DG	Power:		five-point	scale	based	on	Börzel,	(2005)	 0	 1	 0.28	 0.45	
DG	Management:	DG	budget,	HR,	Internal	Audit,	
Anti-Fraud	Office,	Secretariat-General	 0	 1	 0.15	 0.35	
Highest	
qualification	
Highest	qualification	 	 	 	 	
Post-graduate		 0	 1	 0.571	 0.495	
University	degree		 0	 1	 0.290	 0.454	
School	leaving	qualification		 0	 1	 0.067	 0.250	
Vocational	qualification		 0	 1	 0.022	 0.145	
No	formal	qualification		 0	 1	 0.003	 0.050	
Other	or	prefer	not	to	say		 0	 1	 0.047	 0.212	
Subject	of	highest	qualification	 	 	 	 	
Business	or	Economics		 0	 1	 0.24	 0.43	
STEMM		 0	 1	 0.21	 0.41	
Politics		 0	 1	 0.13	 0.33	
Law		 0	 1	 0.11	 0.32	
Humanities		 0	 1	 0.16	 0.37	
Other	social	science		 0	 1	 0.03	 0.18	
Other	or	prefer	not	to	say		 0	 1	 0.13	 0.33	
Philosophic
al	values	
Economic	(low	–	government,	high	–	market)	 0	 10	 4.85	 2.21	
Social	and	cultural	(low	–	liberal,	high	conservative)	 0	 10	 3.06	 2.41	
Gender	
Male		 0	 1	 0.480	 0.500	
Female		 0	 1	 0.46	 0.50	
Prefer	not	to	say		 0	 1	 0.03	 0.16	
Member	
state	
EU13		 0	 1	 0.15	 0.35	
EU15		 0	 1	 0.76	 0.42	
Other	or	prefer	not	to	say		 0	 1	 0.09	 0.29	
Note:	1	–	Yes,	0	–	No	
	
		
